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This article looks at borders during the Covid-19 crisis. In particular, it looks at how internal 
borders have arisen following xenophobic and national responses to Covid-19. This rise of 
internal borders is referred to as the honeycombing of borders. This article takes a genealogical 
approach to understand how borders have arisen—despite not always favorable opinions about 
them. Therefore, this looks at Rancière’s (1999; 2004) concept of the “police order” in the 
imposition of the sensible through Foucault’s genealogical approach, both to show the 
temporary, haphazard nature of these borders and how they revert to less desirable things. This 
is situated within the moment of rightwing populism, where increased prejudice leads to violence 
against everyone. This article uses examples from two rightwing populist countries, Brazil and 
the United States, Australia, which currently has a center-right government and xenophobic 
policies. Japan has had a hegemonic rightwing conservative government. The similarities and 
varieties of these countries show how internal borders vary in different spatial and political 
settings as well as change or persist over time. While these internal borders might suggest power 
concentrating at the local and subnational levels, this article argues that these borders enable 
increased national power. 
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Between 2000 and 2012, 25 new borders were constructed or “substantially fortified” (Jones 
2012, 11); however, nation-states, who worry about public opinion of these borders, have given 
them different names (Jones, 2912, 11-12). Similarly, something akin to borders, but with a 
different form, has arisen within national territories following the 9-11 attacks. These border-like 
practices  control flows of people and counterterrorism through surveillance at non-official 
borders through biometrics (Epstein 2008) and promote the actions of everyday people, outside 
of work, to defend against international threats—terrorism (Amoore 2008, 113). The bordering 
that accompanies these non-traditional borders, while not consistent, relies on “inscription” of 
physical boundaries through “bordering” which “Operate alone upon human bodies, or even 
human consciousnesses with a view to constituting the spatially bounded entity” (Parker and  
Adler-Nissen 2012, 782). Bordering comes at a contradictory time in national sovereignty. For 
example, Brown (2010) suggests that the proliferation of border walls suggests a response to 
nation-states’ “waning sovereignty.” The historian Greg Grandin (2019) argues that the United 
States managed its domestic problems by expanding its “frontier”—be it national borders or 
international wars of conquest. Trumpism is a response to how the United States has reached the 
limit of expanding frontiers (Grandin 2019). Others have focused on nation-states' internal 
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borders (Sassen 2006) for immigration control far from the national border (Shachar  2019). 
However, these often are not visible but symbolic (Schimanski 2015) or theatric (Amoore and 
Hall 2010). International borders may be places where the often softer domestic policies—
relatively non-violent—meet a violent exterior (Bosniak 2003, 4). While exploring the normative 
value of the U.S.-Mexico borderland, Gloria Anzaldua (1987) also expressed these frontiers as 
places where people suffer. 
 While the potential for violence at borders is known, be it against undocumented 
immigrants or foreign countries, what does it mean for borders to spread internally? How might 
this affect the politics of inequality within nation-states? Can we separate this inequality within 
nation-states from the outside of borders? This article does not refer to internally spreading 
borders as metaphorical or too subtle to miss, but instead policed borders that are almost as easy 
to see as international borders. In this sense, this article departs from much of the previous 
scholarship on bordering. An early iteration of borders modern borders is arguably the quarantine 
(Foucault in Nail 2016) during the virus outbreaks, which created borders within cities, that is, 
borders that kept people in their home, in contrast to city walls, which usually kept invading 
armies out. Therefore, the Covid-19 crisis potentially enables a proliferation of borders within 
nation-states at the subnational, municipal, and local levels, which I refer to as a honeycombing 
of borders. This article explores that. The main argument is that there is an emerging aesthetic 
practice of bordering that enacts real borders within nation-states. Still, this bordering does not 
currently suggest a retreat of national power.  
 This article modifies Jacques Rancière’s (2004) theory of aesthetics as used by rightwing 
governments to create internal borders. These subnational, municipal, and local borders change 
the distribution of the sensible, leading to new expectations of what is acceptable. However, in 
contrast to the more revolutionary arts, they do so in ways that ironically strengthen national, 
military, and police power. Therefore, they are similar to critiques of the use of the arts by 
fascism as a way to enjoy national suicide (Benjamin 1968; also see Deleuze & Guattari 1987). 
These borders give a misleading idea of solving Covid-19. This article will explore this through 
three levels of borders. Nation-state strategies moved from the 1.) international arena—that is, 
blaming other countries (Toohey 2020)—to 2.) the domestic arena in terms of welcoming 
citizens back from international areas of Covid-19 outbreak, to 3.) the local region in terms of an 
aesthetic of subnational, municipal, and local hard borders. The time frame of this article is 
limited to the first nine months of 2020 when Covid-19 spread despite the possibility of it 
containing. It is limited to four democracies with either long-standing rightwing national 
governments, rightwing populist hegemonies, or center-right governments with high levels of 
xenophobia: Japan, The United States, Brazil, and Australia. Examples found in media do not 
necessarily summarize or quantify the typical statements but rather illuminate openings for hard 
borders within nation-states. 
 
Borders, Order, and Identity 
 
Borders can be conceptually related to quarantine. As Thomas Nail (2016) explains, borrowing 
Foucault’s theories, the quarantine was a type of urban bordering which came before the nation-
state’s borders. Therefore, it is at least conceptually possible to move from the idea that people 
should remain within their homes' walls to the idea that a nation-state's walls would be an 
adequate quarantine measure. In February 2020, Giorgio Agamben claimed that Italy was 
suspending democracy, i.e., a “state of exception,” when it restricted movement in areas with 
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Covid-19 (2020). Agamben’s suspicions did not outlast the scant medical evidence given by the 
early, widespread Covid-19 pandemic in Italy. The problem with Agamben’s work is it 
overgeneralizes the state of exception beyond its usually fictitious premises (see Agamben 
2005).  However, his short article foreshadowed the potential of rightwing governance through 
some form of internal borders. Slovac Zizek criticizes assumptions that quarantining within a 
home, or in the face of a medical crisis, imposes on freedom. For Zizek (2020a) “We live a 
paradoxical imperative: we are more solidary, not approaching each other.” Thus, Covid-19 does 
not inevitably lead to a break up of community at the national or local levels as implied by 
bordering. If so, why are people choosing a spread of internal borders? Distance from borders 
provides safety from violence at borders’ exteriors (Bosniak 2003, 4). Dangerous borderland 
existence is not something chosen out of privilege (Gloria Anzaldua (1987).  Zizek (2020b) 
partially answers this through two continuities: 1) the near-identical stages of response to 
pandemics in Medieval times and now (including xenophobia) (51), and 2) “the lesson of 
ecology, which is that we unknowingly can contribute” to our extinction (52). Yet, given the 
increases in education compared to Medieval times, repetition does not make sense on its own. 
The degrading to less advanced times seems like it would need to be imposed to gain acceptance. 
Jacque Rancière’s theories provide some idea of how things become normal, and in another time 
abnormally bad, hence unacceptable. The literature reviewed here explores:1) Rancière’s 
aesthetic and more macropolitical theories and 2) Rancière’s theories' applicability to a 
functional political protest and anti-racist struggle.  
Writing on Rancièrehas focused on the application of aesthetics to literature and film. 
This related more to how literature and film could intervene in politics by “repartitioning the 
possible” (Conley 2005). Vaughan (2014) explains that Rancière’s later work looked at artworks 
as constrained by specific parameters, in ways similar to Immanuel Kant’s theories, albeit with a 
difference in the political stakes of doing away with these seemingly unconscious constraints 
(102-103). 
 Rancière’s concept of the police order implies a similar concept, albeit with inverse 
ethical implications. Common ideas about what is sensible can be changed or sustained without 
liberating people. This negative aspect of what is sensible is more applicable to explaining 
micropolitics than micropolitical analyses of film and literature. For example, Havercroft and 
Owen. (2016) use Rancière’s theories of undoing the “police order” as a way to understand how 
The Black Lives Movement can empower black people without ignoring their identity. This 
focus on Rancière’s “police order” as a conceptual step against oppression does not cancel out 
Rancière’s work on aesthetics. Rancière saw a “messianic” role for film, which would lead to 
“dissensus” that would improve society (Conley 2005, 103). Instead, focusing on the police order 
allows us to illuminate oppression when there are few aesthetic objects about Covid-19 and when 
there does not seem to be many positive sources of repartitioning the possible. 
 Rannciere’s concept of the police as something mental also relates to how the past is 
sustained into the future without requiring overt government intervention. This relates Rancière’s 
ideas to Foucault’s idea of governmentality, which has been described as a way to use non-state 
actors to conduct the nation-state’s agenda in ways that may promote racism (Gressgård 2019, 
14). Thus the police order relates to how people may internalize things. Therefore, Rancière’s 
theories fit with the context of governmentality and in a more nefarious way than Foucault may 
have meant. This article thus breaks some new ground by showing how people internalize modes 
of conflict that harm them.  
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 Rancière’s idea of the police order is also compatible with Foucault's genealogies. These 
genealogies have been argued to illuminate that ideas and practices are situated within specific 
time frames (Shapiro 2016). Like Foucault, Rancière sees aesthetics as determining the form and 
interpretation of arts (Vaughan 2014). The police order concept can foreground the process of 
these ideas and practices changing over time in terms of certain processes, e.g., media iterations, 
etc., while being part of a specific time (Shapiro 2016). Indeed, the police order concept 
illuminates why political potential has mostly enabled undesirable processes (see Berardi 2019). 
 Rancière has been criticized for interpreting identity in ways that assume that people of 
color should, or could leave their identity as assigned in the “distribution of the sensible” to 
become more powerful political subjects (Bromell 2019, 264). Perhaps focusing more on the top-
down, albeit somewhat voluntarily accepted, distribution of the sensible imposed by the police 
order can leave room to understand how racial identities are not left behind at will. Thus, this 
article focuses on involuntary inequality, either due to racial disparities in the initial spread of 
Covid-19, or from the usually involuntary spread of Covid-19. Using some factual data that 
shows this can temper some of the problems of the idea that all identities can be left behind. 
Covid-19 thus assumes more of a need to understand the “police force” rather than a voluntary 
change in the distribution of the sensible. This does not mean that Rancière’s work should be 
abandoned, even his criticized idea of identity. A big part of Rancière’s work is how roles and 
potentials are not chosen. According to Ross, Rancière’s“..examples of political disagreement 
concern the struggle for comprehension in which the very questions of what is at issue in a 
dispute and who is speaking are themselves at stake. There needs to be a redistribution of social 
roles and functions for the disagreement to be visible. In particular, this understanding of politics 
makes it clear that any social order is an imposition of incapacities” (2009, 128-129). Thus, 
Rancière’s aesthetics may lead us to be more conscious of who is speaking or not—that is 
oppressed minorities—and how what seems natural in a conflict is something forced upon us. 
Indeed, Rancière’s aesthetics emerge from his anarchist thought (Perica 2019, 23). Thus, his 
work leaves room for a politics that does not have hierarchies such as race. Rancière’s critique of 
identification results from his view that all of our identities are imposed upon us: “Whereas 
identification seeks recognition by identifying with an identity already in place within a given 
police order where all parts already are counted, subjectification disrupts the police order” 
(Bordg 2017, 459). 
 The effectiveness of Rancière’s work in application to real-world events is debatable. 
Todd May situates Rancere’s work within anarchist thought, but in a way that does not make 
political agenda, thus avoiding the trap of Marxism which creates oppression while trying to 
liberate (2007a, 21-22). Perica (2019, 23) makes a similar point. Laurence Piper (2017) has not 
that while Rancière’s idea of disruption influenced The Occupy movement and the South African 
#Fees Must Fall protest, these movements suffered from the lack of focus on politics. Perhaps 
here, the police order idea applies better than Rancière’s other theories because it allows a focus 
on what is happening outside of disruptive politics without forcing an agenda. To explain how 
the police order applies to bordering during Covid-19 does not imply an agenda perse. A plan 
can be decided later, albeit with more focus on policies and institutions than afforded by an 
analysis of film or protest disruption afforded by Rancière’s other theories. Of course, I am not to 
say that analyzing film and disruption is not political and has nothing to offer, but to say that 
analyzing policy may offer some temporary resolve to some debates between scholars of 
Rancière. Within this temporary resolve, there is room to identify problems that lead to 
oppression and consider why people might accept them. 
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 The literature reviewed here shows how Rancière’s theories apply to understanding both 
aesthetics and politics and, to some extent, racism, though his identity concept merits caution. 
This article adds to this by applying Rancière’s work to bordering during Covid-19 through a 
genealogical approach. While I am not the first to consider the possibility, the simultaneous 
application of Rancière and Foucault’s theories to a detailed factual study of how people choose 
the negative aspects and realities of formerly international borders within their community 




A significant concept in this article’s theoretical approach is what Rancière (1999; 2004) calls 
the police order (which is different from a police officer or police department). This concept is 
simar to Galtung’s (1990) “negative peace,” i.e.,  the police force is manifest even when violence 
and authoritarian behavior are not so apparent. However, a significant difference is that the 
police force is likely to precipitate the worst excesses of governance. Within the police order’s 
nonlethal calls for respecting consensus lurks a logic of unwelcoming the outsider that lurks at 
the philosophical heart of Western xenophobia and atrocities (Rancière 1999). As Rancière 
(2004, 89) explains: “Exclusion refers to “the  police distribution of the sensible by the 
subjectivization of those who have no part in it” (85). This “police” exists “as a general law that 
determines the distribution of parts and roles in a community as well as its forms of exclusion, 
the police is first and foremost an organization of ‘bodies’ based on a communal distribution of 
the sensible.” The crucial point here is that by being part of the sensible, problems caused by the 
police order may not be the type that ethical people would be able to identify and protest. These 
practices can operate at a level below normal perception. A conceptual task of this article is to 
expose some of these problems. To understand that the police order is a method of internal 
bordering during Covid-19 is to extend the timeframe of this bordering beyond the pandemic and 
to be able to link these problems conceptually to other problems. 
This article follows the following conceptual framework: 1) there is a limited scale 
genealogy of how internal borders are discussed, and 2), there is an approach that looks at how 
spaces created by these internal borders determine some populations to be valid and others 
invalid, and 3) these problems are put into a short-term specificity using contemporary theories 
of rightwing populism, and 4) this article shows how these problems thought to be only of 
rightwing populism are persistent both in time and other types of government than democracy. 
This article and a forthcoming article (Toohey 2021) conduct a limited scale genealogy of 
Covid-19. The newness of the Covid-19 pandemic prevents a longer timescale. In response to 
discourse, many may expect the accumulation of facts, i.e., a vast “corpus” (Foucault 1989a, 31), 
or mistakenly look for “resemblance or repetition” (Foucault 1989, 24). However, discourse is an 
unthought way of speaking that sets rules of conduct (Foucualt 1989a). One might object that 
this article should have a quantitative set of a large number of actions or statements by the petit 
police or newspaper coverage related to internal borders. Foucault explains that we do not find 
discourse through an author’s oeuvre (1989a)—in this case, journalists—and instead look for a 
“statement” and what it “excludes” (Foucault 1989a, 30-31). Discourse is not about infinitely 
repeating something with “an origin,” but rather its occurrence in a particular time (Foucault 
1989a, 28). “Regularity” is a crucial component (Foucault 1989a, 41). In other words, this article 
conducts a small-scale genealogy to understand what has become regular in reporting on Covid 
and the police-order. Therefore, this article explores how these unacknowledged rules are 
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communicated to effectively influence peoples’ conduct (Foucault 1989a, 232), where we can 
go, who should go there, etc. However, this is mixed with Rancière’s theories because these rules 
of conduct contain a process of setting divisions of populations—into dangerous or safe—based 
on a supposed consensus (1999). Moreover, the limited duration of the Covid-19 pandemic is 
augmented by the longer timeframe of bordering; studies mentioned earlier in this article help 
show the likely nature and impact of Covid-19 internal bordering  
May (2007b, 135) argues that Foucault's genealogy is useful to determine how 
“dangerous” something is by situating it within its “history and character.” While internal 
bordering as a response to Covid-19 presently lacks a long history—compared to Foucault's 
genealogies of prisons, madness, sexuality, etc.—there are two fixes to this. First, bordering, as 
outlined at the beginning of this article, has a long history. Therefore the general history and 
character can serve as a genealogy for Covid-19 internal bordering. Thus, we can expect 
violence, nationalism, and racism from Covid-19 internal bordering. Second, Rancière’s 
theorization of the police force relies on more than two millennia of political thought. Thus, the 
police order aspect beginning with ancient Greek political thought, can serve as a long-term 
genealogy to determine the likely history and character of police-order internal bordering during 
Covid-19. 
 Regularity in heterogeneous situations can be found within authoritarian practices within 
democracies, but also in actual authoritarian practices. As per authoritarian practices within 
democracies, there is the persistent unwelcoming of the stranger (Rancière 1999) and the 
sometimes invisible borders that keep ethnic and racial minorities out of white parts of the city. 
As per authoritarian bordering, there is the unwelcoming of the stranger, equivocally both a 
citizen and a colonial subject. An example of this dual process is The Peoples’ Republic of China 
continued detention, relocation, and forced abandonment of culture during the Covid-19 
pandemic of Tibetans and Ulghers (BBC  2020b). A similar process occurred as a continuation 
of authoritarian relations with indigenous people in a country relapsing into authoritarian rule. 
Brazil’s policy to exploit gold in the Amazon, against indigenous peoples' wishes, has spread 
Covid-19 to Yanomami communities (Phillips 2020). None of these processes happened because 
of Covid-19. Still, the spatial bordering that devalues the voices—i.e., the police order—has 
become even more deadly with the pandemic's spread. Politicians will no doubt avoid taking 
responsibility for claiming it is accidental. But one could also see a similar process in the Dakota 
Access Pipeline in indigenous peoples lands both before and after Trump’s presidency in The 
United States. Indeed, the simultaneous embrace and unwelcoming of strangers is familiar to 
immigrants in democratic nation-states before the current authoritarian turn (see Balibar 1991). 
Suffice to say, all of these processes go on, not always with citizens’ acknowledgment or 
participation, but neither with the average non-affected citizens’ opposition or rejection refusing 
to allow identification with perpetrators as fellow citizens over such atrocities. The latter is a 
solution that Rancière (1991) offers to the ills of democracy.  
 Rancière has critiqued using the term “populist” (2021); however, I use some 
contemporary work on rightwing populist to address a couple of things that Rancière’s work 
does not help us see. The first is the top-down split between rural and urban people. While 
Rancière’s work addresses this, he does so by discussing Classical Greek philosophy, with a 
notion of the city which is somewhat different from what is occurring. Thus, the idea of the 
countryside having power over some city residents authorized by wealthy elites in the city, not 
fully explored in Dis-Agreement. Indeed, much of Rancière’s work in Dis-agreement focuses on 
contemporary France and may only conceptually apply to other countries. Despite these 
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differences, this article avoids the short-termism of many contemporary analyses on populism. 
Raanciere’s work is thus focused on more because he looks at “post-democracy” and its failings 
in neo-liberal France and the long-term fake-democracies that have persisted for more than two 
millennia. Yet, how may these ideas relate to the present and future? 
 Rancière (January 21, 2021) illuminated how racist violence intensified by Trumpism is 
intentional and part-and-parcel of preexisting desires to see others as inferior. Though it is my 
interpretation based on his work, this process could exist outside of democracy. First of all, by 
basing his theories on classical philosophy, Rancière shows that the problems of democracy that 
seem new are part of persistent violence: creating Others ineligible for fundamental rights 
(1999). This timeframe includes governments that were in no way modern pluralist democracies. 
The time frame would have to include The Dark Ages and Medieval Europe (though Rancière 
skips these eras).
1
 Since the problems of anti-democratic politics that Rancière mentions span a 
timeframe that included other forms of governance, they could apply to other less than 
democratic nation-states—e.g., Hungary, Poland, Brazil, or India that often prioritize religious 
identity over democratic freedoms—and to authoritarian countries like The Peoples’ Republic of 
China. This article does not mention all of these cases in detail. Still, it acknowledges them, 
which extends the scope of this article to future studies of the police order in authoritarian 
countries, thereby augmenting the genealogical approach by extending the discussion beyond the 
topical constraints of Covid-19. 
 Rancière’s theories are useful for promoting peace for two reasons. The first is the police 
order concept spotlights how groups that are not rightwing populists may inadvertently aid 
rightwing populism during rightwing populism. Secondly, understanding the police order is to 
identify conflict practices that may be subtle and occurring before and after rightwing 
governance.  
The police order identifies how society decides, somewhat unconsciously, which 
populations are influential and not and distributes them in space. However, unlike identifying 
only the most egregious spatial practices—segregation, apartheid, prisons, border walls, forced 
migration—the police order concept also can illuminate more subtle forms of discriminatory 
oppression. Resultingly, if we are aware of the police order distribution-of-the-sensible, we can 
see connections between the treatment of African Americans, women, Tibetans, Ainu, and 
LGBTQ people. The connection is that they are designated as not fully part of their respective 
societies and thus show that they correspond to denigrated spaces, if not outright exiled from 
their countries. However, the police order also shows things that people miss. As Rancière 
explains, under the guise of equality, this can be the designation and divide between women who 
nurture (boy) children who may become politicians—the implications being that women’s 
exclusion from the spaces of democratic decisionmaking (1999, 41-42). But it could also detect 
something more subtle, sometimes less offensive, the idea that the professor only should speak in 
a classroom. In contrast, the student should passively listen and absorb knowledge. This latter 
example may or may not shape the students into passive, authoritarian roles later in life. What is 
important is how the police order concept links together modes of oppression with sharply 
contrasting amounts of severity; the student with a strict, unconcerned teacher is not as oppressed 
as someone forced to migrate from their country. However, both show undemocratic practices. 
It is tempting to conclude that it is just rightwing or authoritarian politics that ruins 
democracy by enacting the police order. However, there is a danger of inadvertently participating 
in rightwing populism and other forms of authoritarianism. Some police order activities are more 
palatable, even desirable, but should not be accepted (Rancière 1999, 31). One example is how 
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mass media sometimes broadcasts rightwing messages, which this article explores. Fox News or 
fake news outlets that broadcast partisan news are unequivocally rightwing. Therefore, it is 
essential to monitor what they are doing. It is nevertheless crucial to recognize how “liberal” 
news outlets may aid oppression. Before rightwing populism, many U.S. liberal politicians and 
news networks gave into rightwing discourse. In search of a compromise consensus with 
rightwing politicians, their statements supported invading and occupying Iraq and Afghanistan, 
sacrificing civil liberties to fight The War on Terror, and accepting anti-immigration 
discrimination. Yet, the New Left has also accidentally participated in more subtle ways in 
conservative media spectacles by adapting to violent protest imagery, thus self-marginalizing the 
anti-war movement (Gitlin 2003). A lesson from the above is people more inclined to promote 
peace and civil rights may give in to oppressive power structures even in a more benevolent 
political situation. The police order helps us think through this inconvenient fact. The rightwing 
populist ideologies that arose during democracy—and with any luck—will fade away in 
democracies rather than through violent authoritarian governments and war. Therefore, it is 
crucial to know the fault-lines of democracy. 
In order to search for these fault lines, this article looks for a heterogenous regularity. 
That is a regularity beyond resemblance (Foucault 1989a, 76). Instead of looking for examples of 
the police order that are overtly violent or subtly violent, this article looks for both. This 
regularity can be seen as an extension of bordering away from national borders and anti-
immigration measures, to its fringe existence where it claims not to be: inside nation-states. 
Thus, this article is not merely about the Covid-19 pandemic but extends upon a long-standing 
problem: borders. 
  
Welcoming Citizens Home from International Infection Areas 
 
When receiving citizens returning from Covid-19 hotspots, governments often eschewed medical 
science in favor of actions that promoted an idea of safety from infection within national borders. 
This process sometimes favored national citizens at the expense of foreign citizens, though it 
began with an initial distrust of returning emigres or repatriated. The quarantines operated 
somewhat like internal borders. 
Little information about Covid-19 existed at the beginning of the crisis. The lack of 
information does not imply victimization on the part of national governments. In 2016, The 
Obama administration created a document, “Playbook for Early Response to High-Consequence 
Emerging Infectious Disease Threats and Biological Incidents,” which the Trump administration 
claims does not exist (Knight and Kaiser Health News 2020). Japan has a similar politicization of 
disease management. Despite experience handling large natural disasters, Japan has been 
unprepared for Covid-19 or other possible disasters: “nuclear, biological, or chemical hazards” 
(Egawa 2020). This lack of preparation mostly occurs because of governmental reliance on 
panels of experts who inform politicians rather than its equivalent of the U.S. Center for Disease 
Control, National Institute of Infectious Disease (Egawa 2020). The result is decisions mainly 
based on politics (Egawa 2020).  However, this echoes scandals from the 1990s of the Japanese 
governments’ failed response to the 1996 Kobe Earthquake and 1996 notification of how 
hemophilia patients were given H.I.V.-tainted blood transfusions in the early 1980s (Gordon 
2003, 318-319). The convergence of necessary procedures amidst nationalist rhetoric suggests a 
distribution of the sensible of national borders where the interior of the nation-state is assumed to 
be safe, whereas the exterior is assumed dangerous (see Bosniak 2003). 
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 Brazilian president Jair Bolsnaro initially hesitated to let Brazilian nationals in Wuhan, 
China to return. He cited their potential threat to spreading Covid-19 in Brazil, a potential lack of 
budget for an evacuation, and legal hurdles to having them quarantine in Brazil (Reuters Staff 
2020). The plan was to keep evacuated Brazilians in military bases distant from Brazil’s urban 
areas (Phillips 2020). Evacuated Australians were evacuated and sent to quarantine in Christmas 
Island, a notorious holding prison-like holding place for asylum seekers (B.B.C. 2020a). Citizens 
in both countries were treated as threats, even when arriving in their home countries. 
 Americans were evacuated by plane from Wuhan, China, the initial epicenter of the 
Covid-19 virus. This evacuation received considerable news attention. Initial footage of 
disembarking passengers from Wuhan, China shows workers in full hazmat suits assisting them 
from plane to bus (Sun and Abutaleb 2020). The same article alleges that workers were not 
wearing proper protective gear on at least three occasions when assisting evacuees (Sun and 
Abutaleb 2020). This disjuncture between the photo and allegations portrays the distribution of 
the sensible of national space. Covid-19 is contagious in China, but not in The United States, as 
this picture would lead readers to believe. Put another way; The United States border is assumed 
to protect American citizens from Covid-19. The fact that the plane trip originated in Wuhan—
an area hard hit by Covid-19—and U.S. officials knew enough to understand that people on the 
plane could have Covid-19 and transmit it anywhere. However, the act of U.S. citizens crossing 
the U.S. border obscured medical realities. Another news report on the same subject alleges that 
workers left the quarantined military base and returned “freely,” moreover, a worker left 
California using commercial aviation (Cochrane, Weiland, and Sanger-Katz 2020). An online 
C.N.N. report on the same allegations contained a video juxtaposing evacuees disembarking 
from the plane at night—that could elicit fear—and hospital footage of people being treated for 
Covid-19, which later in the movie later seems to be likely from China by Chinese writing 
(Holmes, Watts and Kelly 2020). News commentators simultaneously critique the Trump 
administration and say that the public would rather hear science than politics (ibid).  This focus 
on Covid-19 as a Chinese threat would take on less subtle phrasing from the Trump 
administration. 
 Japan was slightly more careful with people coming into Japan on The Diamond 
Princess. Still, this caution followed a nationalist tone of not wanting to provide medical help for 
people who were not Japanese. Japanese people and foreign residents were kept on the ship, a 
place with a high likelihood of spreading the Covid-19 virus. The national and local governments 
were unwilling to test all the crew’s passengers due to inexperience and cost, and then-Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Yoshihisa Suga’s remarks of a general “toughness” (The Asashi Shimbun, 
February 21, 2020, paraphrased in Nakazawa, Ino, and Akabayashi. 2020). Overall, news reports 
may have promoted a sympathy with Japanese nationals and wealthy residents who could afford 
to travel on The Diamond Princess. Most of the crew members, forced to stay on after passengers 
left and provide essential worker services as the virus spread, were from “low and middle-
income countries in Southeast Asia” (Nakazawa, Ino, and Akabayashi. 2020). Such countries 
may include The Philippines and Thailand, two sending countries for immigrants discriminated 
against and stigmatized in Japan. Ten workers who tested positive for Covid-19 were not 
quarantined from other workers (Denyer, Dutta, and Kashiwagi 2020). 
However, the testing measures that international news media and studies criticize have 
become the norm for most Japanese citizens. Complaints about the handling of Covid-19 aboard 
The Diamond Princess include crew members not tested unless noticeably sick (even though 
Covid-19 often spreads with little or no symptoms) (Kakimoto, Yamagishi, Matsui, Suzuki, 
28 David E. Toohey 
Wakita 2020). This lack of testing has influenced Japanese experts and media outlets to speculate 
that Japan's Covid-19 infection rate may be significantly higher than national infection statistics 
(Wingfield-Hayes 2020; Ripley, Sidhu, Ogura, and Jozuka 2020). Japanese citizens there to help, 
doctors, and Self-Defense Forces soldiers, were allowed to enter and leave from the ship without 
quarantine. There were few taxis to take people to Tokyo, city buses had plastic dividers between 
drivers and passengers, and Japanese and international experts were skeptical that the virus 
would not spread from the ship to Japan (Rich and Yamamitsu 2020). This skepticism was 
despite the Japanese government saying that two weeks quarantine on the ship was sufficient 
(ibid). While this seems a courtesy to people who spent a traumatic time worrying that they 
might be catching Covid-19, it also shows a display of an idea that Covid-19 was a foreign threat 
that did not extend to Japanese people. The extension of Japan’s domestic Go-To travel 
campaign to international tourists will not occur until after Covid-19 is completely solved (Japan 
Tourism Campaign May 28, 2020). In sum, the Japanese government decided that Covid-19 
infection is dangerous in international, not domestic, settings. 
 Welcoming citizens back to their respective countries also set dangerous precedents and 
often enabled prejudicial bordering. In comparison with Japan and the United States, there was a 
bordering which assumed that national territory was immune to Covid-19 while people and lands 
outside of national borders were not. This bordering reinforces trends, old and new. But they also 
heighten nationalism too through aesthetic means. As an analysis of Rancière should state, the 
“distribution of the sensible” means making certain things sensible or possible (2004). Thus, 
prejudice against minorities becomes possible during Covid-19, after years of increased 
acceptance. In 2018, 64% of Australians, 59% of Japanese people, and 59% of Americans agreed 
that immigrants “make our country stronger” (Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey in Ana 
Gonzalez-Barrera And Phillip Connor 2019). With Covid-19 framed as an international threat to 
these countries, borders were closed. In Brazil, in March 2020, Jair Bolsnaro reacted to rising 
Covid-19 cases by promoted continued economic activity while shutting down Brazilian borders 
and not allowing non-Brazils to enter by air (Charner, Darlington, Hu, and Barnes 2020). In the 
United States, Aggressive prejudicial behavior against African Americans and Asian Americans 
rose during Covid-19 (Ruiz, Menasche, Horrowitz and Tamir 2020). But also, ideas of a 
fictitious homeland, safe from a dangerous elsewhere, were reinstated. In sum, the police order 
reinstated national borders and subsequent marginalized populations as a desirable category. 
Therefore, national bordering became desirable, if not to a majority, to enough people to harm 
racial and ethnic minorities. However, as will be explored in the next section, this bordering was 
not merely with foreign countries but became acceptable as an internal matter. 
 
The Honeycombing of Internal Borders to Unwelcome Citizens 
 
As international borders failed to protect residents of nation-states from Covid-19, at the time 
treated as an international, not domestic threat, governments offered a new solution: emphasizing 
subnational, municipal, and local borders. This internal bordering followed two main routes, both 
aesthetic. The first was map-making. In the second,mass media broadcasted police department 
actions. This seemingly new imposition of subnational, municipal, and local borders relied on a 
two-decade-old War on Terror strategy, the mobilization of police departments. This is a police 
order enforcement of new borders, not because police departments and police orders are the 
same things; they are not. Instead, these divisions functioned through the police order through 
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their attempts to reimpose an old category of subordination to police departments and other 
domestic displays of militarism. 
 Borders through the aesthetics of map-making did not arise from xenophobia. An early 
example of this aesthetic would be the John Hopkins University Covid-19 tracking map, created 
to provide medical information and inform people that there could be Covid-19 in their 
communities. In Japan, nightly national television news broadcasts currently display a map of the 
number of new Covid-19 infections by prefecture (sub-national unit). Much as some had 
assumed that The Peoples’ Republic of China was a dangerous Covid-19 hotspot, whereas Japan 
was not, residents of prefectures with low infection rates could assume they were safe by merely 
avoiding prefectures like Tokyo and Osaka that have high infection rates. This appeal to 
subnational borders is unusual for contemporary Japan. Japan’s premodern history was full of 
warring border states (Gordon 2003, 3). Japan’s modern history contains calls to national 
homogeneity (Gordon 2003, 254-256) and attempts to keep Japan linked through the tourism of 
an idealized countryside (Gordon 2003, 307-308).  A similar aesthetic exists within the United 
States. With more detailed information provided, that is concerning cities and counties, residents 
of rural areas could assume that Covid-19 was only a problem for urban areas. In light of the 
demographics, this takes on a racist tone. Rural areas are mostly white. In contrast, “U.S. urban 
cores, racial minorities (especially Black Americans), and those who cast votes for Hillary 
Clinton in 2016 disproportionately comprise counties where COVID-19 cases are currently 
clustered—a stark contrast to areas where there is a low level of coronavirus exposure.” (Frey 
2020). Therefore, while there is a supposedly neutral assumption about how to plan behavior in 
different places during Covid-19, there is a hidden racist logic.  
 In Japan, these distributions of the sensible of map-making helped inform Covid-19 
policy. High-risk areas received simultaneously positive and damaging policies. High-risk areas 
were allowed to declare emergencies and encourage telework and restaurants and bars to shut 
down. However, when the Japanese government tried to boost the ailing tourist economy with 
the “Go-To” campaign, which commenced on July 22, 2020, Tokyo excluded itself over fears 
from “government officials and medical experts” of it spreading Covid-19 from Tokyo to the rest 
of Japan (The Asahi Shimbun 2020a). 74% of Japanese voters surveyed oppose the Go-To 
campaign (The Asahi Shimbun 2020b), and health officials warned that it was happening too 
soon amidst Covid-19 infections (Takahashi 2020.). At the same time, Okinawa, a hitherto low-
risk area with a large indigenous population, was included. Though it is hard to tell if this 
resulted from holiday travel from places like Tokyo during Covid-19—at a U.S. military base, 
there was a no-mask party—the number of Covid-19 cases shortly after the Obon holiday period, 
August 13
th
, 2020. The Okinawan Prefecture declared a State of Emergency on August 13
th
, 
though it did not discourage out-of-prefecture visitors (The Asahi Shimbun 2020c). While many 
cases were untraceable, less than 2% of traced cases were outside visitors, and the United States 
government has not provided enough information on military members to trace how they may be 
impacting the prefecture’s infection rate (The Asahi Shimbun 2020c). One way or another, as an 
oppressed minority, Okinawans suffered the brunt of racism during the Covid-19 period. 
 In other countries, internal borders took on a more policed and militarized response. In 
Australia, temporally banned cross-prefectural travel in some prefectures (BBC. 2020b). 
Australia has a long history of quarantines to infectious diseases involving international and 
subnational borders (Moloney and Moloney 2020). As per a semiotics of bordering, the 
Australian government has a picture of the Coronavirus in blue—a color often not found in 
edible foods. To the left of this is a caption reading, “Each state or territory has their own entry 
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requirements” (Australian Interstate Quarantines n.d.). Therefore, the medical danger of Covid-
19 is highlighted simultaneously to a matter of fact statement that subnational units should be 
authorized to control Covid-19. Therefore, the proliferation of quarantine borders is naturalized 
as a response to a biological threat. An international representation of Australia's response to 
Covid-19 shows a different response. The BBC shows young people drinking in a restaurant 
without protective masks in Australia's “virus-free” Northern territory (BBC 2020a). The photo 
of multicultural, supposedly Covid-19-free youth, partially obscures the inequality of non-white 
refugees and immigrants banned as a Covid-19 threat by Australia. The article details how the 
Northern Territory of Australia has closed its borders with other parts of Australia to deter the 
spread of Covid-19. Thus, borders are blocked as a threat and to protect privileged subnational 
sectors. 
In Brazil, economically prosperous border towns have been allowed exceptions to strict 
national borders and negotiated Covid-19 mitigation policies with Paraguay in towns located on 
both sides of the Brazil-Paraguay border (Arnson, Gedan and Prusa August 7, 2020). Argentina 
has made areas within Argentina for Brazilian truck drivers to stop without contacting 
Argentinians (ibid; Associated Press 2020). However, indigenous people in border areas closer to 
Brazil’s northern border have been hit hard by Covid-19, and those countries have shut down 
border crossings (ibid). Thus, while Brazil has typically mismanaged Covid-19, there are internal 
borders that mark the difference between dysfunctional and effective policies. There is a 
different price on human life, which varies within countries rather than simply across countries, 
as Balmford et al. (2020) say. The Associated Press (2020) shows a picture of an open grave 
with text about how Brazil’s neighbors are worried about its “open borders” during Covid-19. 
The spread of Covid-19 is used in neutral mass media to justify the spread of borders. 
On the East Coast of the United States, two popular tourist destinations, North Carolina’s 
Outer Banks (Elassar 2020) and the Florida Keys, had police prohibit off-island visitors (Lazo 
and Shaver 2020; ). While Dare County, which includes the Outer Banks, banned all non-local 
residents, including out-of-state property owners, this ban assumed that people within the county 
were not Covid-19 risks (ibid). Also, policed roadblocks in Texas and Florida required promises 
of out-of-state travelers to quarantine (ibid), as well as considerations of doing so on the 
subnational border between Kentucky and Tennessee, and coastal communities popular with 
New York City residents (McDonnell Nieto del Rio and Ellis, 2020). These bans assume that 
only people from outside of jurisdiction were threats. Subnational and county borders were 
promoted as barriers that protect against Covid-19 premised upon an unscientific assumption that 
Covid-19 cannot spread within borders. Lazo and Shaver’s (2020) Washington Post article 
visually illustrated the semiotics of militarism and policing with police, aided by military Hum-V 
trucks stopping cars in Rhode Island and police checking peoples’ papers that verify Dare 
County North, Carolina residency. Since these are actual pictures of procedures, they go beyond 
simple media-bias as things that happened. The media repeat the distribution of the sensible 
provided by the military and police. 
While some of the subnational and county-level border checkpoints pertain to people 
regardless of class, race, or ethnicity, they also reveal problematic issues about more oppressed 
people. At face-value, these border checkpoints and police surveillance of people from other 
subnational entities are quite similar to how law enforcement has been positioned along borders 
to stop the immigrants. The door-to-door checkups in Rhode Island somewhat resemble The 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (I.C.E.) raids on undocumented immigrants. However, in 
The Florida Keys, The Outerbanks, and tourist towns in Rhode Island, the people targeted were 
Honeycombing of Internal Borders   31 
 
economically privileged. They did not have to be there. In some ways, the articles lament 
something that has been happening to people of color and immigrants but shows victimization of 
the U.S. population's economically privileged sectors. They are not the people who are getting 
Covid-19 because they have to work in a grocery store, drive a bus, or work as a nurse. The 
people targeted do not seem to come from over-crowded, working-class urban areas with a 
higher Covid-19 infection rate. People in such communities, mostly African-American and 
Latina/o, would benefit from being able to leave. Readers are left with, if not a white 
victimization narrative, an upper-class victimization narrative. In this way, readers’ sympathies 
may momentarily shift away from people of color and immigrants who are harder hit by Covid-
19. Therefore, rightwing populism has promoted a racist narrative within relatively liberal news 
sources. 
While rightwing populism has promoted a mass media forgetting of people of color's 
plight, it also does so while reporting on another group who it disfavors: the urban elite. While 
the urban elite—the upper middle class and wealthy people who can afford to leave cities for 
vacation houses—are better of during Covid-19 than others, they are also economic elite from 
predominantly pluralist cities, a political target of rightwing populism. As Mudde (2004, 561) 
puts it, “In the populist mind, the elite are the henchmen of ‘special interests’. Historically, these 
powerful, shady forces were bankers and international financiers (often alleged to be Jewish). 
But in contemporary populism a ‘new class’ has been identified, that of the ‘progressives’ and 
the ‘politically correct.’” Internal borders thus group this “elite” with the means to escape Covid-
19 hotspots are in the enemy category with immigrants and people of color who are not and 
contrasted with “the people” who are often rural whites. Thus, news reporting leads to a potential 
to divide these political groups, to promote jealousy and competition between them. To critique 
the newspaper articles for ignoring white privilege also strengthens a claim of rightwing 
populism about the corrupt elite. In the United States especially, this potentially splits the 
Democratic Parity’s main constituencies. Not reporting on it also strengthens a claim of 
rightwing populism: people should ignore race and ethnicity.  
 In both Australia and The United States, a police order distribution of the sensible of 
bordering was applied to citizens, not immigrants, to give an illusion that effective policy was 
underway to stop Covid-19. Just like in the case of borders, this was a mere display that made 
peoples’ lives uncomfortable rather than halted the spread of Covid-19. 
 If these borders are spreading internally, often at the request of local, not national leaders, 
it might be reasonably expected that this means an increase in localized power. However, the 
spread of these borders may replicate the former nation-state’s relationship to foreign countries, 
this time applied to smaller states and municipalities. Whereas The United States has coerced 
influence in Latin American countries south of the U.S.-Mexico border, it does so with areas 
demarcated as almost separate in subnational and municipal boundaries. For example, the Trump 
administration has frequently tried to get states to open up their economies early despite having 
higher Covid-19 rates. In other countries, a similar process has occurred. The national 
government declared a state of emergency that included Osaka and Nagoya. Aichi prefecture, 
located between the two cities, declared a state of emergency independent of the national 
emergency. While Aichi Prefecture's state of emergency was not legally binding for its 
businesses and residents, it enabled it to use private property, medical or food supplies if needed 
to fight a mass Covid-19 outbreak (Kyodo News 2020). In Brazil, Bolsnaro has forced 
municipalities to reopen despite high Covid-19 infection rates (Al-Jazeera 2020). Thus, a 
seeming devolution has elicited a harsher nation-state crackdown rather than an increase in 
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subnational power. But this comes through a media repetition of the distribution of the sensible 
of subnational and municipal leaders who are facing off with ineffective national leaders. This 
distribution of the sensible makes it seem as if some portion of these governments had an 
effective policy. However, by assuming the logic and distribution of the sensible of bordering, 
these subnational and municipal units have—intentionally or not—reproduced national 
bordering.  
 In sum, map-making has morphed from a way to share information about Covid-19 to a 
reality and a partition of possibility of internal bordering that makes these borders appear 
sensible, whereas, at other times, they would not. This internal bordering initially diminishes 
subnational and municipal power by reproducing a subordinate relationship that smaller nation-
states have with larger, more powerful nation-states. However, a police order distribution of the 
sensible of borders obscures this subordinate process. Subnational and municipal units either use 
words and images or police intimidation to dissuade cross-subnational-border travel, making 
them look like nation-states enforcing national borders. Yet, as national borders have hardly 
stopped global threats—climate change, vote manipulation, wars, etc.—these subnational 
borders do not stop threats from other areas of their respective nations. These subnational 
borders replicate national borders’ violence. The main difference is that nation-states direct 
violence to subnational and municipal units. An often misleading sense of government dealing 
with Covid-19 distracts from this violence. This distracting illusion is aesthetic because it offers 
one thing, to be consumed through viewing and accepting a sensibility—in Rancière’s (2004) 
terms—of borders. During this police distribution of the sensible, people forget that governments 
are doing little to help underlying problems. 
 To call this a distribution of the sensible of bordering misses one important temporal 
issue addressed better in genealogical terms. This internal bordering is occurring during a global 
situation of rightwing populism. In many cases, the urban areas excluded assume the role of the 
Other rightwing populism. The rural areas consist of “the people” who are usually white, 
whereas urban areas consist of the Other, the corrupt elite, racial and ethnic minorities, and 
immigrants. Therefore, to border off urban areas as dangerous to Covid-19, whereas rural areas 
are safe, mirrors the racialized aspect of rightwing populism in The United States, Europe, and 
Brazil. In Japan, the issue is slightly more complicated, given the low visibility of Identity 
politics. However, areas that are more relevant to the Japanese nation-state, such as Tokyo, are 
more protected, whereas peripheral areas, such as Okinawa, are not. In Okinawa, issues of 
identity are present given the Okinawan peoples’ differing ethnic identities. However, Covid-19 




The main argument has been that there is an emerging aesthetic practice of bordering that enacts 
real borders within nation-states. This emerging aesthetic emerged through three seemingly 
different, albeit linked processes: 1) scapegoating of foreign countries (Toohey 2021), which 
existed before Covid-19, 2) welcoming home citizens from Covid-19 hotspots without proper 
precautions, which elicited a nationalist idea of borders and territory, and 3) the honeycombing 
of borders to deal with certain unwelcome citizens. All three processes contain various forms of 
inequality—that is, criticizing the Peoples’ Republic of China also harmed Asian-Americans. 
Similarly, the idea of welcoming back citizens assumes that non-citizens are not welcome during 
crises. The third category, the honeycombing of borders, appears to merely unwelcome 
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somewhat wealthy people. However, it elicits a militarized policing and reinforces rightwing 
populist ideas of the urban elite as dangerous to rural people (see Mudde 2004). Ultimately, this 
third category is a boomerang effect of xenophobia and inequality inherent in rightwing 
populism. Rightwing populists may think that strong leaders have taken action to control urban 
elites. However, these anti-elite actions obscure how rightwing populists have failed to protect 
them from the Covid-19 pandemic. Covid-19 is now spreading in rural areas where many 
rightwing populists live. This failure is especially apparent in states like Texas and Florida.  
 The internal borders, what I refer to as a honeycombing of borders, and its resultant 
failure to stop Covid-19 might seem to be a weakening of national power. However, this 
honeycombing of borders seems more to assert national power over subnational units. This re-
assertion of sovereignty differs in the countries studied. Subnational entities and municipalities 
in the United States and Brazil that resisted national Covid-19 policies were treated like 
unfavored foreign countries beyond territorial borders. In Japan, subnational entities with high 
Covid-19 rates are excluded from Japan’s image as a country that has succeeded in containing 
Covid-19 without harming its economy. In Australia, a similar thing occurs with some 
subnational entities. An intensely violent version of these above processes occurred in the 
Brazilian Amazon with indigenous people and The Peoples’ Republic of China with the Tibetans 
and Uyghurs who bear the brunt of Covid-19 and national policies to destroy their cultural and 
physical existence. The amount of suffering and oppression in these examples varies 
considerably between these situations; however, they conceptually relate in a discursive way 
through a “regularity” of “heterogeneous” practices (Foucault 1989a). 
 Though not phrased as national, subnational, or municipal borders, precedents exist for 
this type of bordering. Bordering of property into quantifiable land helped expand the U.S. 
frontier across land occupied by Native Americans and Mexicans (Grandin 2019). Yet, what is 
surprising is that this type of border expansion began with land often not considered to belong to 
the United States or different forms of land use protected by treaties. Moreover, the 
honeycombing of borders during Covid-19 troubles an idea of “bordering” as symbolic or subtle 
by following a logic usually observed for the external operations of borders directed against 
foreign countries and non-citizens, especially immigrants. This process, therefore, poses some 
thorny problems for studies of inequality. 
On the one hand, a new group is subject to subnational and municipal borders in the 
United States. On the other, this group is often economically privileged and differs from people 
whose status as people of color, indigenous, low income, female, or too young suffers more 
deaths or job-loss from Covid-19. This is part of a complicated process of rightwing populism, 
which takes attention away from people who have suffered some form of internal bordering. 
African-American and Latina/o neighborhoods in New York City suffered from physical borders 
by another name—Parkways that cut through urban areas—cordoning them off into 
economically depressed areas (Caro 1975) full of police violence. The generalization of this 
process to other people living in urban areas, who rightwing populism lumps into an undesirable 
category along with people of color—needs to consider these long histories of oppression. Mass 
media analyzed in this article does not, but instead presents internal borders as isolated incidents 
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1. A premodern example of pandemics influencing long term affects on other marginalized groups is how, 
as European hospitals for leprosy brought back from The Crusades eventually became the inane asylums 
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